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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Edmunds asserts in his brief that independent grounds for
affirming the judgment exist in the assignment provisions of the
Note/Agreement/Assignment ("NAA") and that Edmunds was entitled to
share in the proceeds of the sheriff's sale. Edmunds may not thus
claim selected benefits from the NAA while ignoring the concomitant
burdens.

The assignment provisions of the NAA could only have

secured payment of the note provisions of the NAA.
provisions exclude personal liability.

The note

The assignment provisions

cannot negate .that exclusion.
Even if the assignment were enforceable, there were no proceeds
from the sale to which the assignment could attach. Edmunds' claim
that Sprouse should have paid the amount of his sheriff's sale bid
into court is barred by Edmunds' failure to challenge the manner
in which the sale was conducted.
Sprouse properly marshalled the evidence on the issue of
whether Edmunds and his principal broker accepted the NAA.

Even

Edmunds' evidence showed that he and his broker acted at all times
as though Sprouse's obligation to them was embodied in the NAA.
Their actions establish, as a matter of law, that they consented
to and accepted the NAA.
Finally, Sprouse's failure to object at trial to Edmunds'
proffer of evidence regarding attorney fees does not preclude
Sprouse from challenging the award of attorney fees. Sprouse does
not challenge the accuracy of the proffer, but only that the
evidence proffered was insufficient to present a prima facie case.

Sprouse v. Jager
Case No. 890642-CA

Insert to Reply Brief of Appellant
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INTRODUCTION
Appellant disagrees with much of the arguments set forth in
the Brief of Respondents.

Pursuant to the provisions of Rule

24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, however, this
reply brief will be generally limited to answering new arguments
raised in the Brief of Respondents.

Any failure of Appellant to

respond to any argument raised in the Brief of Respondents should
not be viewed as an admission that the argument is well-taken.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ASSIGNMENT PROVISIONS OF THE NAA DO NOT
INCREASE SPROUSE^ PERSONAL LIABILITY.
Edmunds argues in Point I of his brief that he is entitled
to recover against Sprouse pursuant to the "assignment" portion
of the Note/Agreement/Assignment ("NAA").

Edmunds asserts that

the real estate commission was included in the judgment Sprouse
obtained against Jager (the judgment debtor), and that Edmunds
owned an assignment of the underlying Uniform Real Estate Contract, and that Edmunds was accordingly entitled to a share of
the "proceeds" of the foreclosure sale.
The primary

difficulty with this argument

is that the

assignment only secured payment of the note, and other portions
of the NAA clearly excluded any personal liability on the note.
In addition, there were no "proceeds" of the foreclosure sale.
Edmunds supports his argument with four subpoints.

These

points will be addressed in the order presented in Edmunds1 brief.
A.
Sprousefs Judcrment Acrainst Jager Did Not Necessarily
Include The Commission.
Edmunds recites that the selling price of the motel was set
at $475,000.00 because Sprouse wanted at least $450,000.00, so the
$25,000.00 commission was included in the sale price.
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Edmunds

further recites that Sprouse received certain properties in lieu
of a down payment, and deduces from these facts that the commission must have been included in the unpaid balance of a contract
due from Jager.

Edmunds then argues that this reasoning process

somehow supports his claim that Sprouse is personally liable for
payment of the commission notwithstanding the provision of the NAA
to the contrary.
One cannot look at the sales price and state that the
commission is included in any particular portion, or included at
all.

Even if that were possible, the facts and logic set forth

by Edmunds just as readily support Sprouse's position. If Sprouse
is personally liable for payment of the real estate commission,
it is irrelevant whether the amount of that commission was
"included"

in the sale price or "included"

in the judgment

ultimately obtained against Jager. By arguing that the commission
was included in the sale price and judgment, Edmunds in reality
admits that the commission was to come only from Jager.

If the

commission is "included" anywhere and if Sprouse were personally
liable, one would assume that the commission was "included" in the
money or assets Sprouse has already received, i.e., the downpayment.

The portion identified by Edmunds as "including" the

commission is that portion of the sales price which has not been
paid. This bolsters Sprouse's contention that the commission was
not to be paid unless Jager paid.

3

Sprouse has obtained a judgment against Jager and acknowledges that if that judgment were collected from Jager, Edmunds
would be entitled to recover his commission from the proceeds
collected from Jager.
The academic

The judgment is, however, uncollectible.

question of whether the commission

is somehow

"included" in the judgment is otherwise irrelevant.
B.
Edmunds Is Entitled To The Proceeds Of The Sheriff's
Sale Because There Were No Such Proceeds.
Point I.B. of Edmunds' brief argues that the assignment
provisions of the NAA give Edmunds a right to share in the
proceeds of the sheriff's sale.

There were, however, no such

proceeds. The only bid at the foreclosure sale was that tendered
by Sprouse, and consisted only of a credit for the benefit of
Jager against the judgment in favor of Sprouse.

The sheriff

conducting the sale accepted the bid and conveyed title to the
property to Sprouse.

Edmunds has not brought any action to set

aside the sale or otherwise challenge the actions of the sheriff
in accepting the bid, nor has Edmunds otherwise challenged the
validity of the sale.
In the event that any proceeds are realized from the judgment
against Jager, however, Edmunds would be entitled to only a prorata portion of those proceeds, pursuant to the authorities set
forth in Edmunds' brief.
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C.

The Assignment Secures Only Payment of The Note,

Sprouse did not make an absolute assignment to Edmunds of all
of Sprouse's interest in the Uniform Real Estate Contract, but
only assigned that interest to secure his obligations under the
NAA.

The terms of the NAA clearly limit that obligation as

applying only to payments "received by Heritage [Thrift and Loan]
under the Unifrom [sic] Real Estate Contract referred to above.11
Edmunds argues, in Point I.e. of his brief, that his assigned
rights are entitled to priority over the rights of Sprouse. The
arguments might have merit if Sprouse had any remaining obligation
to Edmunds which was secured by the assignment and it
received any proceeds in the foreclosure.
factors are present.

Sprouse had

Neither of these

Because Sprouse1s debt to Edmunds was

contingent upon Jager making payments, the assignment is likewise
contingent.
D.
Sale.

Sprouse Did Not Receive Any Proceeds from the Sherifffs

Point II.D. of Edmunds' brief again asserts that Edmunds is
entitled to share in the "proceeds" from the sheriff's sale. As
explained above, however, there were no such proceeds. If Edmunds
had an objection to the Sheriff accepting a credit bid from
Sprouse, Edmunds should have objected to the sale and filed
appropriate pleadings to set it aside.

Having failed to object

to the manner in which the sale was conducted, Edmunds cannot now
claim an entitlement to "proceeds" which do not exist.
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POINT II
THE ASSIGNMENT PROVISIONS OF THE NAA DO
NOT CONFLICT WITH THE PROVISIONS RELIEVING
SPROUSE OF PERSONAL LIABILITY.
Edmunds argues in Point II of his brief (at p. 28) , that
there was no point in making an assignment of a portion of the
Uniform Real Estate Contract if Jager has no personal liability.
The exclusion of personal liability could be construed to limit
the effect of the assignment.

It does not follow, however, that

the provisions are inherently conflicting and that the exclusion
of personal liability must be totally eliminated in order to give
greater effect to the assignment.
clearly to the contrary.

The rule of construction is

All of the parts of a contract should

be given effect insofar as is possible.

Larrabee v. Royal Dairy

Products Co., 614 P.2d 160, 163 (Utah 1980) (citations omitted).
The assignment provision of the NAA does have a purpose, even
with the exclusion of personal liability.

As proffered by Mrs.

Sprouse, the purpose was to permit Edmunds to protect his commission by stepping into the shoes of Mr. Sprouse and foreclosing
against Jager if necessary.

(Tr. 255.)

In fact, if Sprouse has

been personally liable for the commission, there would have been
little need for the assignment.

Had Sprouse been personally

liable, Edmunds could have enforced that liability by action
directly against Sprouse. If he had been successful in obtaining
a judgment against Sprouse, he could have executed on Sprousefs
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interest in the Uniform Real Estate Contract. The granting of an
assignment

and

the

concomitant

right

of

stepping

into Mr.

Sprouse's shoes to foreclose against Jager was necessary only
because Sprouse was not personally liable.
POINT III
EDMUNDS AND HIS BROKER MUST BE DEEMED, AS A
MATTER OF LAW, TO HAVE ACCEPTED THE NAA.
Edmunds asserts on page 39 of his brief that Sprouse has
failed to marshall all the evidence both for and against the trial
court's findings relating to the NAA.

Although Sprouse has not

restated the entire transcript, Sprouse did set forth the primary
testimony both for and against the NAA.
21-22.)

(Brief of Appellant, pp.

Sprouse has thus fulfilled his duty to marshall the

evidence.
The primary thrust of Sprouse's argument, however, was not
that there was no conflicting evidence, that rather that even
Edmunds' evidence established, as a matter of law, that Edmunds
and his broker had accepted the NAA. Edmunds' broker assigned the
NAA to Edmunds shortly after closing.
assigned the NAA to a bank.

Edmunds

subsequently

Although not initially named as a

party to this action, Edmunds filed an affidavit in the action to
assert rights under the NAA.

Edmunds' initial pleadings in this

action assert rights under the NAA.
Edmunds argues that his actions in purchasing an assignment
of the NAA for full cash value is inconsistent with the limitation
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of personal liability, and that only a fool would have made such
a transaction
enforceable.

if the

limitation of personal liability were

It is not the province of the courts, however, to

inquire into the wisdom of a transaction.
Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 1983).

Bekins Bar V Ranch v.

It is possible that Edmunds

purchased the assignment for full cash value because he believed
that Jager would pay.

(Sprouse presented evidence that Edmunds

had made glowing representations concerning Jager's ability to
pay. E.g., Tr. 168-69.)

There may have been other factors. The

reasons why he made the assignment are not particularly important,
because there is no dispute that the assignment was made, and that
Edmunds and his broker consistently acted as though Sprouse's
obligation to them was embodied in the NAA.

The great weight of

the evidence established, as a matter of law, that Edmunds and his
broker had accepted the NAA, and are bound by all of its terms.
POINT IV
SPROUSE'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROFFER
REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES DOES NOT PREVENT
HIM FROM CONTESTING THEM ON APPEAL.
In Point IV of his initial brief, Sprouse challenged that
award of attorney fees on two grounds: First, that Edmunds failed
to present a prima facie case that the fees were reasonable, and
second, that only a third of the fees were related to the points
on which Edmunds prevailed.

Edmunds has responded by asserting

that Sprouse did not object to the evidence at trial and is
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therefore precluded

from

challenging the sufficiency

of the

evidence, and that the claim is raised for the first time on
appeal.

These argument will be addressed in order.

Edmunds argues that he proffered evidence at trial concerning
his attorney fees, and that Sprouse is somehow bound by that
proffer. (Brief of Respondents, page 44.)
brief, Edmunds
proffer."

On page 46 of his

refers to the proffer as a "stipulation and

No stipulation was made.

The transcript (a copy of

which is attached as Appendix "H" to Appellant's Brief) demonstrates that Sprouse's counsel initially queried whether the
parties could reach a stipulation concerning reasonableness, but
Edmunds counsel instead made of proffer of what the testimony
would be. (Tr. 162.)

The only response of Sprouse's counsel to

the proffer was an acknowledgement that it correctly reflected
what the testimony would be. (Tr. 163-64.)

No stipulation or

other agreement was made concerning the reasonableness of the
fees.
Sprouse still does not challenge the validity of the proffer.
Sprouse further does not dispute that the hours were spent as
testified.

Sprouse only asserts that the evidence proffered was

not sufficient to make a prima facie entitlement to an award of
attorney fees.
Edmunds asserts that had Sprouse challenged the evidence, he
could have presented additional evidence at the trial.

The

defendant does not, however, have the burden to explaining to the
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plaintiff, prior to the plaintiff resting his case, in what areas
the plaintiff's proof is deficient. It is the burden of plaintiff
to present a prima facie case.

If he fails to do so, the defend-

ant may move for a dismissal without ever having made any objection to the evidence.

See Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b).

Sprouse is not, therefore, trying to avoid any stipulation
he made.

Sprouse simply asserts that Edmunds failed to present

a prima facie case, and further, even if a prima facie case was
presented, two-thirds of the fees are not recoverable in any event
because they were not related to the points on which Edmunds
prevailed.

Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 776 P.2d

643 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Edmunds also asserts that this issue is raised for the first
time on appeal.

The issue was raised at least as early as the

hearing on Sprouse's "Motion for New Trial," which was made prior
to the entry of the judgment.

(Minute Entry, March 14, 1989.)

CONCLUSION
The great weight of the evidence admits of no other conclusion but that Edmunds and his principal broker accepted all the
benefits of the NAA, and viewed Sprouse's obligations for the
payment of a real estate commission to be embodied in the NAA.
Edmunds continues, on appeal, to assert that he is entitled to
benefits from the NAA.

Any benefits from the NAA must come

together with the burdens.

The limitation of personal liability
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in the NAA is enforceable according to its terms.

The judgment

against Sprouse must be reversed.
DATED this 29th day of May, 1990.

FRED D. HOWARD and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellant
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